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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________                        
 
No. 11-1757 
_____________ 
 
MIGNONE SALLY N'JIE;  
EDWARD B. MENDY,  
Appellants 
 
v. 
 
MEI CHEUNG; JIN LOK;  
ABC INSURANCE COMPANY;  
XYZ INSURANCE COMPANY                         
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-09-cv-00919) 
District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 13, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES and CHAGARES, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion Filed: November 20, 2012) 
                         
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge
 
. 
Plaintiffs, tenants of a property in Nutley, New Jersey, appeal from the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of their landlord, Defendant Mei Cheung, 
and Cheung’s husband, Defendant Jin Lok.  We will affirm.   
Plaintiffs and Defendant entered into a lease agreement covering a term from 
April 15, 2007 through April 15, 2009.  At the end of the lease agreement, the 
following language was added in handwriting: “Option to renew for one year lease 
terms.  Rent for second year shall be $2400.00.  Option to buy.  Right of first refusal.”  
(App. 69.)  In January 2009, Cheung informed Plaintiffs that she and her husband 
would be moving into the property, and told Plaintiffs that they would have to move 
out.  (App. 228.)  Claiming that Cheung unlawfully deprived them of their option to 
buy the property, Plaintiffs initiated this action in March 2009.  In total, Plaintiffs 
asserted 14 claims against Defendants. 
In an opinion dated March 1, 2011, Judge Chesler granted Defendants’ motion 
for summary judgment in its entirety and dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims.  (Doc. No. 67; 
App. 5.)  With regard to Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims, Judge Chesler reasoned 
that Defendants showed “an authentic, subjective intention to personally occupy their 
unit” (App. 9), thereby demonstrating good cause for refusing to renew the lease, and 
that the lease agreement could not be interpreted to give rise to an enforceable option 
to buy.  Because the District Court concluded that Cheung did not breach the lease 
agreement, it granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ inducement of breach of 
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contract and unjust enrichment claims in favor of Defendants.  Furthermore, because 
the parties agreed that Cheung never made a “clear and definite” promise to sell the 
property, the District Court granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ detrimental 
reliance claim in favor of Defendants.  Finally, the District Court concluded that 
Plaintiffs had not adequately alleged facts to support their “post-termination 
violations” claim or their libel and slander claim.  
Plaintiffs’ appeal of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Defendants raises three issues: (1) whether the District Court erred in granting 
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment; (2) whether the District Court erred in 
failing to grant Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(f) motion; and (3) whether the District Court erred 
in failing to permit Plaintiffs to continue to depose Defendants.1
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s decision de 
novo.  Viera v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 642 F.3d 407, 413 (3d Cir. 2011).  Summary 
judgment is proper if no genuine issue of material fact exists, and if the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 
 
                                              
1 Defendants raise objections to the notice of appeal filed by Plaintiff Edward B. 
Mendy, arguing that Mendy violated Magistrate Judge Shipp’s August 16, 2010 order 
by signing the notice of appeal as Pennsylvania counsel despite not being admitted to 
the Pennsylvania bar pro hac vice, and urging this Court to dismiss the appeal.  
Because Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, however, the Court finds it inappropriate to 
dismiss the instant appeal.  Accordingly, we will address the merits of Plaintiffs’ 
appeal.  
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247 (3d Cir. 2004).  We also review the legal interpretation of contractual language de 
novo.  Id.   
In challenging the legal conclusions reached by the District Court, Plaintiffs 
largely recycle arguments they made in opposing Defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment.  We will adopt Judge Chesler’s well-reasoned opinion, which rejected 
Plaintiffs’ arguments the first time around.  Plaintiffs’ other arguments do not 
convince us that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment.   
Plaintiffs argue for the first time on appeal that Defendants violated New 
Jersey’s Anti-Eviction Statute by initiating an eviction action before the end of the 
lease and by failing to provide proper notices to Plaintiffs.  Plaintiffs failed to make the 
first argument in District Court.  However, even if they had, this line of argument 
would not be sufficient to demonstrate that Defendants breached the lease agreement – 
if anything, Defendants failed to comply with the procedures contemplated in the Anti-
Eviction Statute.2
                                              
2 The language of the Anti-Eviction Statute states that “[n]o . . . tenant . . . may be 
removed by the Superior Court from any house [or] building . . . except upon 
establishment of one of the following grounds as good cause: . . . (l)(2) The owner . . . 
seeks to personally occupy the unit.”  N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(l)(2).  Furthermore, owners 
seeking to evict tenants pursuant to that provision must provide “two months’ notice 
prior to the institution of the action and, provided that where there is a written lease in 
effect no action shall be instituted until the lease expires.”  N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.2(f). 
  However this is not indicative of their breach of the lease 
agreement itself, and indeed, the Statute contemplates the owner’s intent to personally 
occupy the premises as “good cause” for non-renewal and the basis of a removal 
proceeding. 
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Plaintiffs also argue that the District Court erred in failing to consider parole 
evidence with regard to the “option to buy” provision.  Plaintiffs insist that extrinsic 
evidence would demonstrate that the provision was an option, giving them unilateral 
power to compel Cheung to sell them the property.  All parties agree that New Jersey 
law governs contract interpretation in this case.  Accordingly, a contract must be 
“sufficiently definite,” meaning “that the performance to be rendered by each party 
can be ascertained with reasonable certainty.”  Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 128 N.J. 
427, 435 (1992).  The contract language at issue states: “Option to renew for one year 
lease terms.  Rent for second year shall be $2400.00. Option to buy.  Right of first 
Refusal.”  We agree with the District Court in concluding that this language – which 
lacks all material terms – cannot be interpreted to give rise to an enforceable option to 
buy.  By Plaintiffs’ own admission, the terms of the option were vague and unspecified 
and needed to be negotiated.  Defendants did not breach the lease agreement by 
refusing to sell the property to Plaintiffs.   
Plaintiffs also object to the District Court’s rulings regarding discovery.  
Plaintiffs argue that the District Court should have granted Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(f) 
motion3
                                              
3 Plaintiffs filed their Rule 56(f) motion before amendments to Rule 56 took effect in 
2010.  As part of a general restyling of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
language of Rule 56(f) was amended and incorporated into Rule 56(d).  See 
Pennsylvania Dep’t of Public Welfare v. Sebelius, 674 F.3d 139, 157 n.3 (3d Cir. 
2012). 
 requesting additional discovery, and also should have allowed Plaintiffs to 
finish deposing Defendants.  “Our standard of review with regard to the district court’s 
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management of discovery is abuse of discretion.”  Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa., 211 
F.3d 760, 778 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Horvath v. Keystone Health Plan East, Inc., 333 
F.3d 450, 458 (3d Cir. 2003) (reviewing a district court’s decision to preclude further 
discovery in response to a summary judgment motion under an abuse of discretion 
standard).  “[W]e will not upset a district court’s conduct of discovery procedures 
absent a demonstration that the court’s action made it impossible to obtain crucial 
evidence, and implicit in such a showing is proof that more diligent discovery was 
impossible.”  In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 818 (3d Cir. 1982) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  We conclude that the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(f) motion or by refusing to 
extend deposition deadlines.  Discovery was closed – with finality – by Magistrate 
Judge Shipp.  As set forth in Magistrate Judge Shipp’s order dated August 16, 2010, 
Plaintiffs repeatedly failed to meet discovery deadlines, disregarded court orders, and 
engaged in “the discovery game of hide and seek.”  (See Doc. No. 37.)  Clearly, 
Plaintiffs can attribute any missing discovery only to their own neglect – the District 
Court gave them adequate opportunity to “obtain crucial evidence,” and they have not 
demonstrated explicitly or implicitly that “more diligent discovery was impossible.”  
In re Fine Paper, 685 F.2d at 818.  It was not an abuse of discretion for the District 
Court to deny Plaintiffs’ request.   
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment for Defendants.  
